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COMMENTARY
DAVID J. HAYES*

Integrating ESA Goals into a Larger
Context: The Lesson of Animas-La
Plata
ABSTRACT
The process by which the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service examines
whether proposedfederal projects satisfy the Endangered Species
Act gives the Service considerable power to influence proposed
projects. Using the Animas La Platawater project as a case study,
however, Hannah Gosnell has suggested that the Fish & Wildlife
Service's institutionallimitations reduceits ability to shapefederal
projects to conform with species protection needs. This author
disagrees.The Fish and Wildlife Service can have a profound impact
on federal projects through the Section 7 consultation process by
identifying issues and species needs that can trigger a serious
review of project alternatives.In the case of Animas-La Plata, the
Service's 1991 biologicalreview led to a complete reexaminationof
the proposedproject andafundamentalalterationof the natureand
scope of the project in a way that satisfied the Endangered Species
Act and other policy imperatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hannah Gosnell's excellent article questions whether the U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service (FWS or the Service) undertook a broad enough
examination of alternatives when it was evaluating the compatibility of an
early version of the Animas-La Plata (A-LP) water project with the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).1 She suggests that in 1991 the Service missed
an opportunity to change the direction of the project, in part because of her
proposition that the FWS cannot compete against a more powerful "action"
agency (here, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) during the ESA consultation
process.2 Gosnell relies on the FWS draft 1991 Biological Opinion in the
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former Deputy Secretary of the Interior. From approximately 1997 to 2001, he took the lead,
along with Secretary Babbitt, in addressing the long-standing controversy associated with the
Animas-La Plata Project. Mr. Hayes thanks Michael Connor, the former Director of the
Department's Indian Water Rights Office, for his assistance with this article.
1. The Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. 9§ 1531-1544 (1994).
2. Specifically, Gosnell states in her article that "it seems ludicrous that the FWS had to
depend upon the Bureau of Reclamation" in the consultation process.
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Animas-La Plata Project to conclude that the Service too rarely says "no" to
projects-particularly western water projects-inferring that the Service is
a paper tiger having little ability to influence the nature or scope of AnimasLa Plata or other proposed water projects.
In developing her argument, Gosnell makes a number of good
points. Her conclusion, however, misses the mark. As the Animas-La Plata
Project itself demonstrated, the Fish & Wildlife Service's biological
conclusions often define the playing field for action agencies and other
interested parties. Ms. Gosnell feared that the draft 1991 Biological Opinion
would provide the basis for a flawed A-LP project to go forward. It did not.
Instead, the Service's strong statement that far less water could be taken out
of the Animas River than had previously been assumed had the practical
effect of halting the project in its tracks, just as effectively as if the Service
had issued a "jeopardy" opinion in 1990.1
As explained at length below, the Service-induced stalemate
triggered reconsideration of the fundamental architecture of the original ALP project. With the FWS significantly limiting water withdrawals from the
Animas River to protect endangered fish species, the prospect of building
a massive reservoir near the Animas River to feed a large new irrigation
project no longer seemed realistic. Colorado Governor Roy Romer entered
the breach and tried, unsuccessfully, to broker a solution between project
proponents and opponents.
Ultimately, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt concluded that
the original A-LP Project was a dead letter. He offered a fundamentally new
approach that proposed to revamp and scale back the project by cutting out
all irrigation use of water from the Animas side of the project and to
downsize the off-stream water storage of the project to match up with the
Fish and Wildlife Service's views of acceptable depletion levels on the
Animas River. The result was a proposed project that could meet the federal
trust responsibility by addressing the water rights of the Ute Mountain Ute
and Southern Ute Tribes, but that otherwise bore little resemblance to the
original Animas-La Plata Project. Following completion of a public process,
including the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact
statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
Congress essentially agreed with the Babbitt plan and changed the law
accordingly.4

3. As explained in more detail in Gosneil's article, the 1990 jeopardy opinion concluded
that the original A-LP project would create too much demand on Animas River water (154,800
acre-feet per year in depletions). The 1991 draft biological opinion proposed to significantly
limit depletions by nearly one-third-to 57,100 acre-feet for the project.
4. Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L No. 106-554, App. D, Div.
B; Tit. III, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-258 (2000).
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Thus, despite Gosnell's thesis that the FWS issues too few
"jeopardy" opinions and that the Service's institutional limitations make it
a mostly-ineffective player among federal agencies, the Animas-La Plata
case study tells a different story. In the case of A-LP, the 1991 draft
Biological Opinion had the practical effect of a jeopardy decision. Although
the Service identified "reasonable and prudent alternatives" (RPAs), the
significant constraints that such RPAs proposed to put on the project raised
questions about the viability of the project and alerted project opponents to
weak points in the project's design.
The project was stopped, and a long process of reexamination of
various project alternatives began. While it is true that the FWS did not
drive the formulation of potential alternatives to the design of the A-LP
project, Congress never intended the FWS to use the consultation process
to play a dominant role in that regard. In the case of A-LP, a full range of
project alternatives emerged from administrative and legislative processes
and were analyzed in a public NEPA process. The process was full, robust,
and public, and it generated a new proposal that satisfied federal trust
responsibilities to the Ute Tribes, while fully complying with all
environmental requirements.
II. DEVELOPING REASONABLE AND PRUDENT ALTERNATIVES
AS PART OF THE ESA CONSULTATION PROCESS
The Endangered Species Act is dedicated to species protection, first
and foremost. When drafting the ESA, Congress also sought to avoid ESA
confrontations between proposed federal actions and listed species where
it could. As a result, the ESA incorporates a process-related goal of seeking
to find ways to protect species in a manner that accommodates other public
policy needs. Accordingly, when it appears that a proposed federal action
may jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species, Congress
requires the FWS to identify "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the
proposed project that may allow a modified project to go forward without
harming the species in question.5
Gosnell's article questions the theory and application of this aspect
of the ESA, using the A-LP project as an example in point. On the theory
side, she asks whether the FWS has the institutional capability to identify
reasonable and prudent alternatives to proposed projects when the Service

5. Gosnell reviews the role of RPAs, noting that RPAs were developed, in part, to avoid
the type of irreconcilable conflict that triggered the snail darter conflict in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The FWS also has developed habitat conservation plans
under the authority of Section 10 of the Act as another technique for ensuring species
protection in the context of development pressures.
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must rely on the federal agency that is backing the proposed project for
information and analysis regarding potential alternatives, despite the lack
of interest that the agency may have in vigorously exploring alternatives.
She states that the "problem with an action agency taking the lead is that
the agency's ideologies and biases are reproduced and institutionalized and
become part of the law."
On the application side, Gosnell questions how it can be that the
FWS finds that so few federal projects trigger "jeopardy" opinions, and how
it is that so many other projects can be rejiggered through the imposition of
RPAs to pass the ESA test. Gosnell notes that the law provides the Service
with broad discretion in formulating reasonable and prudent alternatives,
and she concludes that RPAs are likely influenced by politics as much as
science. She speculates that "[h]istorically, the Fish and Wildlife Service
relied on identifying reasonable and prudent alternatives to questionable
projects subject to a Section 7 consultation as a way of minimizing the
impact of the law and appeasing developers."
It is my turn to make a sweeping proposition or two on these
subjects, before turning to the A-LP case example for a more rigorous
discussion. My observations flow primarily from my experience,
particularly from my tenure as Deputy Secretary of the Department of the
Interior, where I had authority over the Fish & Wildlife Service.
With regard to the institutional role played by the FWS in
developing RPAs, there is no question that the Service must rely primarily
on the agency that is proposing the project in question to help identify
potential alternatives. The ESA's Section 7 consultation process puts the
FWS in a reactive role. The Service does not shape projects; it responds to
projects that have been proposed by other federal agencies.
This dynamic is essential, in my view, to the successful
implementation of the ESA. The consultation process should not present the
FWS with an opportunity to become a land management agency, or a water
agency, by empowering it to make decisions on whether and how to deliver
government services under implementing statutes as diverse as the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act and the Reclamation Act. The Service
does not have these statutory responsibilities, and it clearly does not have
the institutional capability to take over these responsibilities and revamp
proposed projects.
Rather, the Service's core expertise is evaluating how a proposed
project may affect a listed species. If there is a potential impact on the
species, the FWS has a right to push the proposing agency to come up with
alternative ways of implementing the project that will mitigate or eliminate
such impacts. But the Service's biologists, who are experts on the species
and not the project, should be asking the questions, not imposing their
worldview on the underlying merits of the project itself.
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For those who would prefer that the FWS both ask and answer
questions regarding a proposed project and impose their will more
aggressively in redesigning projects presented to them, I offer two relevant
observations. First, the National Environmental Policy Act-and not the
ESA-is the federal law that is intended to fully explore a range of basic
alternatives to a proposed action. NEPA establishes a public process that
includes substantial procedural safeguards. It is a far better, and more
appropriate, context to evaluate fundamentally different approaches to
meeting project purposes than, say, a Fish & Wildlife Service biologist's
review of the ESA impacts of a specific proposed project.6
Second, I disagree with the suggestion that because the FWS is not
in a position to force adoption of fundamentally different project ideas by
a consulting agency, its role under the ESA becomes trivialized, with RPAs
becoming tools of appeasement. Because the ESA gives the FWS both a
"nuclear" weapon (the jeopardy opinion) and access to "conventional"
weapons (the no jeopardy decision, conditioned on the satisfaction of
reasonable and prudent actions that are defined by the Service), agencies
that are seeking ESA approval for a project must and do listen to the Service.
Indeed, it is my experience that agencies would rather take a proposed
project back to the drawing board than trigger a "jeopardy" opinion from
FWS. And many agencies are willing to go the extra mile in agreeing to
expensive and difficult-to-implement conditions of going forward, if such
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" are needed by the Service to give an
ESA green light."
I will admit that these observations lack empirical proof.9 But they
are at least as relevant as the statistical information regarding the number
of times that the FWS exercises its nuclear power and issues a "jeopardy"
biological opinion. And in the absence of compelling empirical evidence, we
are thrown back to the case example at hand-the Animas-La Plata
project-which, I believe, illustrates these points rather effectively.

6. Gosnel acknowledges thatNEPA could play such a role, but she suggests that because
the ESA has more "teeth," alternatives should be more rigorously explored by the Fish &
Wildlife Service as part of the reasonable and prudent alternatives review. My concern is that
the ESA may have its teeth knocked out if the Service uses the RPA review as a vehicle to
engage in the type of project scoping process that NEPA is far better equipped to handle.
7. This phenomenon may explain why so few "naked" jeopardy opinions are issued by
the Service as part of the Section 7 consultation process.
8. Ironically, Gosnell makes this very point early in her article, when she quotes a
regional solicitor of the Department of the Interior as characterizing the Fish & Wildlife
Service's role in working with other agencies as "interagency coercion."
9. I do not believe that it would be difficult to obtain such proof. Interviews of project
managers whose projects implicate ESA issues would provide a fertile source of such
information.
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III. ANIMAS-LA PLATA-THE POST 1991 STORY
A. Overview
Gosnell's article points to the FWS 1991 draft Biological Opinion as
an example of the ESA's institutional shortcomings. The article suggests
that the Service caved in to the water interests that were pushing for the
large A-LP project by issuing a no jeopardy biological opinion that allowed
the project to go forward, albeit with certain restrictions. Gosnell also
asserts that because of the Service's institutional limitations on defining
itreasonable and prudent alternatives," the Service failed to identify and
request consideration of a completely different approach to satisfying local
needs than that proposed by the consulting agency, the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation.
If the clock stopped on the A-LP project in 1991, there might be
considerable merit to some of Ms. Gosnell's claims. The story that follows
issuance of the draft 1991 biological opinion, however, argues for a much
different conclusion. Specifically, the FWS draft Biological Opinion was the
most significant factor in halting the project and triggering a public
discussion about whether the project should go forward at all and, if so,
whether it should be fundamentally redesigned before it did.' 0 As discussed
below, the net effect of the subsequent activity was the enactment of new
legislation that cut out significant aspects of the original project and allowed
for a scaled down project that was sized to fit the Service's determination
of the depletions that were allowable under the ESA.
The A-LP story line indicates that the FWS draft 1991 Biological
Opinion, rather than being a sop to water interests, played a critical role in
stopping and reshaping the project. The FWS did not take the lead role in
identifying the outlines of a new project (appropriately, in my view), but
there can be no question that a broad public debate occurred on
alternatives, through both the administrative and legislative processes. And
NEPA-not the ESA-provided the appropriate legal and analytical
framework for this analysis.

10. The draft biological opinion was not the only factor that slowed down the project.
Serious issues were raised by project opponents regarding the adequacy of the project's
compliance with NEPA and compliance with cultural resources survey requirements.
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B. Post-1991 Highlights
By severely limiting Animas River depletions by nearly twothirds-from the proposed 154,800 acre-feet per year to 57,100 acre-feet per
year-the FWS draft 1991 Biological Opinion provided the grist for project
opponents to question the wisdom of the project. The opinion raised
fundamental questions about the viability of building a massive off-stream
reservoir that was designed to hold 280,000 acre-feet of Animas River water,
and subsequently designing and constructing large new irrigation works
that potentially could irrigate nearly 66,000 acres of land, when these
projects would require much larger draws on the Animas River than the
FWS would approve. Wasn't this folly?
The debate shook the region, prompting Governor Romer to
institute a public process to seek out a compromise solution that would be
acceptable to both project proponents and opponents. Over the course of
several years, then-Governor Roy Romer and then-Lieutenant Governor
Gail Schoettler urged the factions to come toward the middle. They did not
succeed in their quest, but the mediation nonetheless was valuable because
it presented two new alternatives for consideration: (1) so-called "A-LP
Lite," which called for the construction of a large, off-stream reservoir, but
which put a temporary hold on the balance of the project; and (2) the socalled "non-structural alternative," which recommended that the area's
water needs be satisfied primarily by existing reservoir assets and new
water purchases, rather than by the construction of an off-stream reservoir.
The "A-LP Lite" proposal was incorporated into legislation (S. 1771)
that Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell introduced during the 105th
Congress. Congressional hearings were held on June 24,1998. The Clinton
Administration opposed the proposal, primarily on environmental grounds.
The project was oversized and did not match the depletions allowed by the
FWS. The EPA raised serious concerns about the impacts that the proposed
new irrigation works would have on water quality. Also, adequate
environmental reviews on the project had not been undertaken and the
Campbell legislation proposed to override the potential need for additional
NEPA compliance. 1
A firestorm of more controversy followed. The loudest objections
came from the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes, who were
counting on the A-LP project to satisfy their water rights claims."2 The Ute
11. See generally Joint OversightHearingof the Comm. on IndianAffairs with the Subcomm. on
Water and Power of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Res. on S. 1771 and S.1899, 105th Cong.
(testimony of Eluid Martinez, Commissioner of Reclamation).
12. The reserved water right doctrine is a well-established feature of federal law. Some
parties questioned whether the Ute Mountain Ute and the Southern Ute Tribes had valid
federal reserved water rights, despite Congress's affirmation of such rights in 1988. The
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Tribes had been willing to compromise their substantial water rights claims
in the context of the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of
1988, so long as they could develop "wet" water through the A-LP project.
The rejection of A-LP Lite appeared to end that plan, potentially leaving the
tribes back at square one.
Driven by concern of satisfying the government's trust
responsibility to the tribes, Secretary Babbitt proposed a new plan in
August of 1998 that focused on satisfying the needs of the tribes by
providing access to water supplies in a smaller off-stream reservoir,
supplemented by water purchases in the marketplace, a concept derived
from the "non-structural" alternative. A limited amount of municipal water
also would be available from the reservoir for the local jurisdictions on a
non-subsidized basis, but no irrigation water would be allowed, and none
of the proposed irrigation works would be constructed.
Secretary Babbitt also insisted that the Department of the Interior's
proposal be subject to a full NEPA analysis, along with the two major
alternatives that surfaced during the Romer/Schoettler process: A-LP Lite
and the non-structural alternative. This would ensure that if an A-LP project
were built, there would be no environmental shortcuts. All environmental
issues would be fully evaluated.
Over the next two years, a supplemental environmental impact
statement was prepared to evaluate the Administration's proposal against
a number of potential alternatives, including the non-structural alternative
and the "no action" alternative. During the course of the process,
refinements were made to the Administration's proposal, but the essential
project remained the same: a smaller, off-stream reservoir, sized to the Fish
& Wildlife Service's depletion analysis, 3 and dedicated primarily to
satisfying the tribes' water rights.14

Solicitor of the Interior, John Leshy, transmitted a memorandum addressing that subject dated
September 9,1999. The Leshy memorandum concluded that the tribes have valid water rights
that were recognized by the United States and that needed to be addressed as part of any
Animas-La Plata settlement.
13. The reservoir that was analyzed in the supplemental EIS was enlarged from 90,000
acre-feet to 120,000 acre-feet, in order to ensure that the reservoir would not need to be drained
in order to access the active storage pool. The larger reservoir would produce better water
quality, as well as provide potential recreational opportunities. It would not, however, rely on
larger depletions from the Animas River than the Fish & Wildlife Service had identified in its
draft 1991 biological opinion.
14. As part of the review of the revised project, the interests of downstream tribes also
were fully evaluated. The proposed project included a set-aside of water for the Navajo Nation,
and it authorized the construction of a new Navajo drinking water pipeline from Farmington
to Shiprock. In addition, resolution of the Ute Tribes water rights ended the uncertainty about
depletions in the Animas River, thereby clearing the way for the implementation of tribal
water rights in the San Juan Basin. Accordingly, the Navajo Nation and the Jicarilla Apache
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The public EIS process provided an opportunity for all voices to be
heard on this important subject. Large public meetings were held in
Durango and Denver, Colorado, and Farmington, New Mexico. Hundreds
of comments were filed and Congress held several hearings on the subject.
By the end of the process, there was little doubt that a full range of potential
alternatives was on the table for consideration. No one was relying on the
FWS to flesh out a new approach to the project as part of its consideration
of "reasonable and prudent alternatives." The Service's draft Biological
Opinion had helped to catalyze attention to the issue, but a variety of policy
interests-particularly the trust-related responsibilities-was now driving
the issue.
After the NEPA process was completed, the Administration signed
a Record of Decision that selected its modified proposal as the preferred
path for the Animas-La Plata project."' The modified proposal was judged
to provide the best means to satisfy the government's trust responsibility
and to implement the 1998 settlement with the tribes, particularly in light
of the potential environmental benefits of the proposal.16
Despite the radical departure of the proposal from the original plan
and the resulting disappointment of many of the water users in the area, the
FWS had helped bring a needed dose of reality to the region by scaling back
expectations. The Clinton Administration reinforced those diminished
expectations and made it clear that the only hope for a bipartisan end to the
long-running A-LP controversy was to build a smaller project that
conformed to the NEPA analysis and focused primarily on tribal water
rights. A February 15, 2000, letter from Bruce Babbitt to environmental
leaders (see table 1) made the point eloquently. In the end, a bipartisan
Congress united around the revised project, with the Senate passing the
legislation by an 85-to-5 vote.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ESA's Section 7 consultation process is not perfect, but it
provides the FWS with the leverage needed to ensure that projects
proposed by federal agencies will not adversely affect listed species.
Although the FWS does not have the institutional capability to redesign
projects proposed by other agencies, the A-LP project illustrates the power

Tribe explicitly endorsed the revised project in a letter to Secretary Babbitt dated August 24,
2000.
15. The Record of Decision was signed on September 25,2000.
16. The non-structural proposal, which would have required the purchase and transfer
of a large percentage of the water rights in the basin, raised potentially serious wetlands issues,
as explained more fully in the supplemental environmental impact statement that was
prepared for the project.,

636
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of the Service's conditioning authority to force a reconsideration of project
assumptions. The Service's draft opinion helped to trigger a complete
examination of the merits of the project. The evaluation proceeded in the
public arena, under NEPA's watchful eye. It generated a new and different
project that better addresses environmental and other public policy
concerns, while remaining true to the project's need to resolve the longstanding tribal claims to Animas basin water.
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Table 1: February 15,2000, Letter from Bruce Babbitt to Environmental
Leaders
Mr. Vawter Parker
Executive Director
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund
180 Montgomery St., Suite 1400
San Francisco, CA 94104
Dear Mr. Parker:
I am writing in response to your recent letter expressing opposition to the
Administration's proposals for implementation of the Colorado Ute Water
Rights Settlement.
As you are aware, in 1988, Congress enacted the Colorado Ute Water Rights
Settlement Act which secured for the Ute Tribes a specific quantity of water
from Animas-La Plata (ALP) to settle their water rights claims in the Animas
and La Plata River basins. Implementation of this settlement has been longdelayed, thus denying the Tribes the benefit of the agreement they reached
with their non-Indian neighbors, the State of Colorado, and the United States
in the mid-1980s. The delay has triggered a clause in the settlement agreement
which now necessitates a decision - whether to honor the fundamental tenets
of the settlement or force the Tribes to litigate their water right claims.
In August 1988, I presented an Administration proposal to finalize
implementation of the 1988 Colorado Ute Water Rights Settlement Act. At
that time, I made it clear that we would not take environmental short-cuts in
resolving this issue. Accordingly, our proposal was downsized to satisfy our
responsibilities under the Endangered Species Act. In addition, we committed
to submit our proposal, as well as competing proposals to settle the Tribes'
water rights claims, to an environmental review process under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The preliminary results of the NEPA
analysis were made available on January 14 with the release of a draft
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). The draft SEIS
recommended a modified version of the Administration Proposal as the best
alternative to resolve the Tribes' water rights with the least environmental
impacts.
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Table I (Continued)
Our proposal bears no resemblance to the massive ALP project that has been
opposed by the environmental community for many decades. Gone is the
irrigation component of the project, which called for much more water than
the Animas River could support, and which would have brought with it serious
water quality concerns. Gone is an oversized reservoir that would create a
continuing incentive to divert more water from the Animas River than the river
system can tolerate. What is left is a down-sized off-stream reservoir that
satisfies the bulk of the Tribes' water rights, and which stores a limited amount
of unsubsidized municipal water for the growing communities in the Durango
and Farmington areas. The balance of the Tribes' water rights would be
secured through market purchases of water rights, an approach that many
environmental groups have advocated.
I particularly want to emphasize my concern that we honor our obligation to
the Ute Tribes by carrying through on commitments that were made in the
1988 settlement. In order to get this matter settled, the Tribes have made
significant concessions in response to environmental concerns and it is now
time for us to reciprocate.
Justice Black once admonished, "Great Nations, like great men, should keep
their word." The time has come to fulfill our trust responsibility to the-Tribes. I
am committed to follow through on this responsibility by working with the
Congress to enact legislation in this session.
An identical letter has been sent to all the signatories of the February 2, 2000,
letter.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Bruce Babbitt
The Secretary of the Interior
U.S. Department of the Interior
Washington

